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Topic 1: Address 
The Twilight of Employment at Will? 
An Update 
THEODOREJ. ST. ANTOINE* 
INTRODUCTION 
A 55-year-old white male, who has spent thirty years working his 
way up to a responsible middle-management position in his company, is 
asked for his resignation. No reason given. Even though the employee 
could demonstrate that he still is qualified to perform his duties, the em-
ployer's action in dismissing him would be quite unexceptionable under 
the conventional American common law doctrine of employment at will. 1 
The situation could be even more disturbing. If the employment-at-will 
principle were allowed its full scope, an employee would have no re-
course even if he knew he was being discharged because he had refused to 
commit perjury at the behest of his employer, or had refused to partici-
pate in an illegal price-fixing scheme, or had taken time from work to ful-
fill his civic duty of serving on a jury. 
One would like to assume that these latter, more extreme cases are 
relatively rare. But the practical problem of the employee who is dis-
missed unfairly, with all the shattering economic and psychological con-
sequences that may follow, is a sizeable one. One careful scholar has esti-
*Mr. St. Antoine is a James E. & Sarah A. Degan Professor of Law, University of 
Michigan. A.B., Fordham College; J.D., University of Michigan. 
1Today a broad range of federal and state statutory protections apply to certain classes 
of employees. For example, the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1976), 
prohibits discharges because of union or other concerted activity; Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U .S.C. § 2000e (1976), prohibits discharges because of race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin; and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 
U.S.C. § 621 (1976, Supp. II 1978 & Supp. III 1979), prohibits discharges because of age 
from 40 to 70. 
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mated that about one million nonunion, nonprobationary employees are 
discharged annually in this country, and that of this number as many as 
100,000 would have viable causes of action if they were afforded the 
same ''just cause'' protections available under the usual collective bar-
gaining agreement. 2 
Probably the most significant development in the whole field of labor 
law during the past decade has been the growing willingness of the courts 
to modify the common law at-will employment doctrine. The rest of this 
paper will briefly examine the sources of that doctrine, sketch out the 
main lines of recent qualifications and exceptions to it, and speculate a bit 
about possible future, directions. 
COMMON LAW OF EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS 
It is an oft-told tale that the rule making employment arrangements of 
indefinite duration contracts at will, terminable by either party at any time 
for any reason, is not a rule which has roots deep in the English common 
law, 3 but one which sprang full-blown in 1877 from the busy and perhaps 
careless pen of American treatise writer Horace G. Wood. 4 Wood has 
been strongly criticized for relying on dubious precedent, with no square 
holdings supporting him. 5 Nonetheless, his pronouncement was admira-
bly suited to the Zeitgeist of an emerging industrial nation. Before the 
nineteenth century was out, our courts could confidently assert: ''All 
[employers] may dismiss their employees at will, be they many or few, 
for good cause, for no cause or even for cause morally wrong, without be-
ing thereby guilty of legal wrong.' '6 
Professor Wood has had his defenders as well as his detractors. It has 
been pointed out, for example, that he was anticipated by California's 
adoption of an at-will principle in the Field Code in 1872/ and by such 
2Stieber, The Case for Protection of Unorganized Employees Against Unjust Dis-
charge, in INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS RESEARCH ASS'N, PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-
SECOND ANNUAL MEETING 155, 160-61 (B. Dennis ed. 1980); THE EMPLOYMENT-AT-
WILLISSUE-A BNA SPECIAL REPORT 24 (Nov. 22, 1982). 3Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time for a Statute 62 
VA. L. REV. 481, 485 (1976); 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF EN-
GLAND 425-25 (R. Bell ed. 1771) (general hiring of menial labor for an unfixed term 
presumed to be for a year). 
4H. WOOD, LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT 272-73 (1877). 
5See, e.g., Note, Implied Contract Right to Job Security, 26 STAN. L. REV. 335, 
340-45 (1974). 
6Payne v. Western & A.R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884). See also Martin v. New 
York Life Ins. Co., 148 N.Y. 117,42 N.E. 416 (1895). 
7This provision now appears in slightly modified form in CAL. LABOR CoDE § 2922 
(1971 & Supp. 1984). 
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decisions as Hathaway v. Bennett in New York8 and Perry v. Wheeler in 
Kentucky. 9 Furthermore, the traditional English rule presuming a hiring 
period of one year was apparently grounded in the medieval Statutes of 
Labourers, which were initially designed as pro-employer measures to 
prevent unauthorized quitting or wage-gouging by employees during the 
periods of severe labor shortages resulting from the Black Death. 10 By the 
mid-nineteenth century, English courts also held that, absent an express 
contractual provision, either party could terminate an employment rela-
tionship upon "reasonable notice" in accordance with the "custom of the 
trade. " 11 
The theoretical underpinning of employment at will consists of such 
concepts as freedom of contract, lack of assent, and most specifically in-
adequacy of consideration and absence of conventional mutuality of obli-
gation. It would, of course, be contrary to the Thirteenth Amendment to 
compel an individual employee to work against his will. Contemporary 
contract analysis has become increasingly skeptical, however, about the 
soundness of such doctrines as consideration and mutuality of obligation, 
thus clearing the way for major judicial surgery, especially in the more 
egregious cases. 
Three quite different groups of employees have managed to escape 
the harsh strictures of employment at will. The first consists of the minus-
cule handful of persons whose knowledge or talents are so unusual and 
valuable-the rock star, the professional quarterback, the corporate 
executive-that they have the leverage to negotiate a contract for a fixed 
term with their employer. Second, over half of the approximately fifteen 
million employees of federal, state, and local governments are protected 
by tenure arrangements or other civil service procedural devices. 12 In ad-
dition, all public employees have certain minimum constitutional rights to 
free speech, due process, and so on. 13 The third category, of course, is 
composed of the workers covered by collective bargaining agreements, 
80% of which expressly prohibit discharge or discipline except for 
8Hathaway v. Bennett, 10 N.Y. 108 (1854). 
9Perry v. Wheeler, 75 Ky. (12 Bush) 541 (1877). 
10See, e.g., C. BAKAL Y & J. GROSSMAN, MODERN LAW OF EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS 
2 (1983); 2 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 459-60 (2d ed. 1923). 
11 Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Committee on Labor and Employ-
ment Law, At-Will Employment and the Problem of Unjust Dismissal, 36 THE RECORD 
170, 175 (1981). 
12Peck, Unjust Discharge from Employment: A Necessary Change in the Law, 40 
OHIO ST. L. J. 1, 8-9 (1979). 
13See, e.g., Pickering v. Bd. ofEduc., 391 U.S. 563 (1968); Perry v. Sindermann, 
408 u.s. 593 (1973). 
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"cause" or "just cause. " 14 Union membership in the United States, 
however, has now declined to only about 20% of the total labor force. 15 
We may thus assume that something like 70 to 75% of our 100-million-
plus work force operates under contracts at will. The gravity of the prob-
lem of subjecting so large a group to arbitrary treatment by management, 
however one might resolve the problem, needs no further elaboration. 
RECENT JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENTS 
Overview 
Different commentators will understandably differ in their analysis 
and classification of the burgeoning mass of judicial decisions on em-
ployment at will. By my own reckoning, jurisdictions modifying the at-
will doctrine in one way or another through holdings or strong dicta now 
number about twenty: California, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Ha-
waii, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, 
New Mexico, Oregon, and West Virginia. Less definite expressions of a 
willingness to revise the doctrine in appropriate circumstances are found 
in a half dozen additional states: Arkansas, Colorado, Idaho, Iowa, Ne-
braska, and Wisconsin. Several states have accepted or said they would 
accept modifications in certain situations while rejecting them in others: 
Alabama, Indiana, New York, Pennsylvania, and Washington. On the 
other hand, about nine states have recently reaffirmed the at-will princi-
ple: Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, North Carolina, Ohio, South 
Carolina, Texas, and Vermont. 
In assessing the courts' attitudes in these early trail-blazing decisions, 
I am satisfied that most attention should be focused on the particular fact 
situations involved, and caution exercised about swallowing whole the 
abstract language of the opinions. Whether in recognizing or refusing to 
recognize an exception to the traditional doctrine, the courts have often 
spoken in much too sweeping terms. For example, I doubt whether any 
court would now decline to sustain at least a nominal cause of action if a 
discharge flagrantly violated a fundamental, legislatively declared public 
policy. On the other hand, despite some very broad language in opinions 
from such jurisdictions as California and Massachusetts, I do not believe 
14Peck, supra note 12, at 8. 
15U.S. BUR. LAB. STAT., HANDBOOK OF LABOR STATISTICS-1978, BULL. No. 2000 
at 507 (1979); New York Times, May 31, 1983, at 1, col. 1. 
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there is a square holding by any court that an employer may not fire an 
employee without a showing of just cause, except where there is a con-
tractual provision to that effect. 
Both tort and contract theories have been used by the courts, singly or 
in combination, to ease the grip of the at-will employment doctrine. Tort 
concepts are peculiarly well suited to the truly outrageous situation, 
where the conscience of the court is shocked and yet it would be hard to 
find that the employer had committed itself contractually to the employee 
in any way. On the other hand, a less venturesome court is likely to find 
contract theory more congenial. If it can be said that the employer has 
limited its own freedom of action, expressly or impliedly, then it is not 
the court that is imposing a new duty; rights are simply being enforced in 
accordance with the parties' voluntary undertaking. 
There are important practical differences, depending upon whether a 
particular action is characterized as tort or contract. For example, the stat-
ute of limitations for a tort action is usually shorter than for a contract ac-
tion. Perhaps most important, tort opens the way for compensatory and 
punitive damages, damages for mental distress, and the like, none of 
which are ordinarily an element of recovery in contract. 
Tort Theories 
Discharges Contrary to ''Public Policy'' 
Probably the most appealing case for recognizing the tort of wrongful 
discharge is where the employer has violated some fundamental public 
policy, especially one that has been clearly enunciated by the legislature. 
Some courts would apparently make that second condition, namely, a 
legislative (or constitutional) declaration of policy, an essential ele-
ment.16 Cases invoking the public policy exception fall naturally into 
three categories: where the employee was discharged for refusing to en-
gage in unlawful activity, where the employee was discharged for per-
forming a public duty, and where the employee was discharged for exer-
cising a legal right or privilege. 
16see, e.g., Firestone Textile Co. v. Meadows, 114 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3559,3561 
(Ky. 1983); Suchodolski v. Michigan Canso!. Gas Co.,412 Mich. 692,316 N.W. 2d 710 
(1982); Adler v. American Standard Corp., 290 Md. 615, 432 A.2d 464 (1981). Other 
courts, if taken at their word, have flatly declined to recognize public policy exceptions to 
the at-will doctrine, regarding it as a matter for the legislature. E.g., Molder v. South-
western Bell Co., 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2409 (Tex. Civ. App. Dec. 29, 1983); Murphy 
v. American Home Prod. Corp., 58 N.Y. 2d 293, 448 N.E. 2d 86 58 N.Y.S. 2d 293 
(1983); Kelly v. Mississippi Valley Gas Co., 397 So. 2d 874 (Miss. 1981); Goodroe v. 
Georgia Power Co., 148 Ga. App. 193, 251 S.E. 2d 51 (1978). 
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Refusal to Commit Crime. Petermann v. Teamsters Local 39617 
was the case that broke through the once-solid barriers of employment at 
will. A labor union fired one of its employees because he refused to per-
jure himself on behalf of the union before a state legislative committee. 
The California Court of Appeals recognized a cause of action, concluding 
that public policy would be seriously undermined if an employee could be 
dismissed for a refusal to commit the crime of perjury. Similarly, in Ta-
meny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 18 the Supreme Court of California sus-
tained a cause of action when an employer discharged an employee for re-
fusing to participate in an illegal price-fixing scheme. Although a court 
might be troubled in certain borderline situations, for example, when the 
employer did not realize it was demanding an illegal act of its employee, 
it is difficult to see how any court today could be so constrained by hide-
bound notions of employment at will that it would not uphold a cause of 
action when an employee is dismissed for a refusal to participate in a 
clearcut instance of unlawful conduct. 
Public Duties and "Whistleblowing." In a celebrated case, Nees v. 
Hocks, 19 a wrongful discharge action was sustained when an employee 
was fired for taking time from work to serve on a jury. The most common 
examples of discharges for performing a public service involve so-called 
''whistleblowing. '' An employee is fired because he reports to the civil 
authorities, or even to superiors in his own company, concerning the 
wrongdoing of his employer or his co-workers. The easiest case for al-
lowing suit is where the employee is also being importuned to break the 
law himself. 20 There are, however, substantial variations in these cases. 
The employee may have responded to an official subpoena, or he may 
have seized the initiative in speaking out. His suspicions may or may not 
be well-founded. He may in all good faith cause substantial damage to the 
reputation of an innocent party. As. might be expected, the courts have re-
17Petermann v. TeamstersLocal396, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959). 
But cf. Brockmeyer v. Dunn & Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d 561, 335 N.W.2d 834 (1983) (al-
leged wrongful discharge is contract action, not tort; no violation of public policy merely 
because employee was discharged in part for a statement that he would testify truthfully if 
called as witness in sex discrimination case). 
18Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 
839 (1980) (contract and tort action upheld). See also Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical 
Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 72,417 A.2d 505 (1980); Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 
Conn. 471,427 A.2d 385 (1980); Trombetta v. Detroit, Toledo & Ironton R.R. Co., 81 
Mich. App. 489,265 N.W. 2d 385 (1978). 
19Nees v. Hocks, 272 Ore. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975). See also Reuther v. Fowler & 
Williams, Inc., 255 Pa. Super. 28, 386 A.2d 119 (1978). 
2~ameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 
839 (1980). 
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sponded differently to these differing situations, upholding some actions 
and denying others. 21 
Legal Rights and Privileges. The most frequent situation in which 
employees have been discharged for exercising legal rights involves the 
filing of workers' compensation claims in states where the statute does 
not contain an express prohibition of employer retaliation. Several juris-
dictions have recognized a cause of action in these circumstances, reason-
ing that it would frustrate the public policy behind workers' compensation 
if employees could assert their statutory rights only at the risk of losing 
their jobs. 22 Some courts have gone the other way, arguing that if the leg-
islature wished to protect employees filing workers' compensation claims 
against employer retaliation, such a provision could easily have been in-
cluded in the statute. 23 
Potentially the most expansive recent decision in this area is Novosel 
v. Nationwide Insurance Co. 24 The Third Circuit, purportedly applying 
Pennsylvania law, found actionable an employee's discharge for refusing 
to join his employer, an insurance company, in lobbying in favor of no-
fault legislation and for privately opposing the company's position. The 
court concluded that "a cognizable expression of public policy" could be 
derived from the free speech provisions of either the Federal or State 
Constitution. 25 It is well established, of course, that the Federal Constitu-
tion's guarantees of free speech, due process, and equal protection under 
the First and Fourteenth Amendments operate directly only against state 
action and not against that of private parties. 26 Decisions under the vari-
ous state constitutions are more mixed, however, and it has been argued 
21 Causes of action were recognized in Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 
Ill. 2d 124,421 N.E. 2d 876 (1981), and Harless v. First Nat. Bank, 246 S.E. 2d 270 (W. 
Va. 1978), but rejected in Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174 
(1974); Campbell v. Eli Lilly & Co., 413 N.E. 2d 1054 (Ind. App. 1980); Hands v. Na-
tional Living Centers, Inc, 633 S.W. 2d 674 (Tex. App. 1982); Murphy v. American 
Home Prod. Corp., 58 N.Y. 2d 293,448 N.E. 2d 86, 58 N.Y.S. 2d 293 (1983). Some of 
the seemingly contrary decisions are distinguishable on their facts. 
22E.g., Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E. 2d 425 (1973); 
Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E. 2d 353 (1978); Firestone Textile Co. 
v. Meadows, 114 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3559 (Ky. 1983); Brown v. Transcon Lines, 284 
Ore. 597, 588 P.2d (1087) (1978). 
23E.g., Martin v. Tapley, 360 So. 2d 708 (Ala. 1978); Segal v. Arrow Indus. Corp., 
364 So. 2d 89 (Fla. App. 1978); Green v. Amerada Hess Corp., 612 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 
1980), cert. denied, 101 S.Ct. 356 (1980). Cf. Meredith v. C.E. Walther, Inc., 422 So. 
2d 761 (Ala. 1982) (lawsuit against employer for claimed employee trust assets). 
24Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. I 983). 
25/d. at 899. 
26Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 
(1972); Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976). 
8 Employment at Will 
that the free speech protections of state constitutions should properly be 
regarded as prohibiting the discharge of private employees for the expres-
sion of political views. 27 If substantive free speech constitutional provi-
sions are to be considered expressions of public policy binding on private 
employers, the next step will be to maintain that procedural due process 
constitutional provisions are likewise binding. 
Other dismissals declared actionable because an employee had been 
exercising a legal right or privilege included a discharge for refusing to 
take a lie detector test in a jurisdiction prohibiting its forcible administra-
tion,28 and the discharge of a store manager for taking a statutorily guar-
anteed ''day of rest'' during which his store was burglarized. 29 
Where the "public policy" sought to be protected is the right to en-
gage in union activity, courts have held under the federal preemption doc-
trine that the NLRB has exclusive jurisdiction. 30 Preemption problems 
beyond the purview of this article could be presented if the Labor Board 
and the courts do not continue to insist upon a "concerted" element in 
employee conduct as a prerequisite to its being protected under section 7 
of the National Labor Relations Act. 31 Otherwise, the discharge of a sin-
gle protesting employee, now frequently actionable under the new public 
policy exceptions to the at-will employment doctrine, might remain 
within the exclusive domain of the NLRB. 32 
"Abusive" or "Retaliatory" Discharges 
Some courts have gone beyond the more standard ''public policy'' 
exceptions and have recognized a cause of action when an employer has 
sought to exploit his position for personal advantage. The prototype of 
this kind of case is Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 33 where a female worker 
was fired for refusing to date her foreman. Other courts have declined to 
27See Note, Free Speech, the Private Employee, and State Constitutions, 91 YALE L. 
J. 522 (1982). 
28Perks v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 611 F.2d 1363 (3d Cir. 1979) (applying 
Penns~lvania law). 
2 Cloutier v. Great At!. & Pac. Tea Co., 121 N.H. 915, 436 A.2d 1140 (1981). 
30Viestenz v. Fleming Cos., 681 F.2d 699 (lOth Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 
303 (1982); Morris v. Chem-Lawn Corp., 541 F. Supp. 479 (E.D. Mich. 1982). 
31 See, e.g., Meyers Industries, Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. No. 73 (Jan. 6, 1984), overruling 
Alleluia Cushion Co., 221 N.L.R.B. 999 (1975); (f. NLRB v. City Disposal Systems, 
Inc., 104 S.Ct. 1505 (1984). 
32The Supreme Court has generally been quite liberal, however, in allowing state 
regulation in the areas of employment discrimination, Colorado Anti-Discrimination 
Comm'n v. Continental Airlines, 372 U.S. 714 (1963), unemployment compensation, 
New York Tel. Co. v. New York State Dep't of Labor, 440 U.S. 519 (1979), and similar 
welfare concerns, see, e.g., Teamsters Loca124 v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283,297 (1959). 
33Mongev. BeebeRubberCo., 114N.H. 130, 316A.2d549(1974). 
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remedy such personal abuse or similar retaliatory conduct. 34 These latter 
courts apparently believe that the public policy exception should not be 
stretched to cover what are essentially disputes between individuals. On 
the other hand, some commentators have contended that all unjust dis-
missals undercut the community's interests in fairness and productivity in 
the workplace, and therefore should be actionable as matters of public 
policy.35 
Contract Theories 
In the last few years the courts have turned increasingly to contract 
theory in fashioning wrongful discharge actions. As indicated earlier, 
more conservative courts are likely to find comfort in the notion that they 
are not forging new law for the parties, but are merely enforcing the par-
ties' own promises. On the other hand, the logic of contract theory also 
means that an employer may generally eliminate an employee's cause of 
action for wrongful discharge by an express disclaimer of any right to em-
ployment. 36 Furthermore, the grounds for establishing many contractual 
claims are often likely to be restricted by their very nature to middle man-
agement and higher personnel. Contract remedies will also be much more 
limited, since ordinarily they will not include compensatory or punitive 
damages. 37 
Express or Implied Guarantees 
In the early 1980s a number of courts concluded that an employer's 
statement of policy as set forth in personnel manuals or employee hand-
books, or an employer's oral assurances to employees at the time of hir-
34E.g., Fawcett v. G.C. Murphy & Co., 46 Ohio St. 2d 245, 348 N.E. 2d 144 
(1976); Larsen v. Motor Supply Co., 117 Ariz. 507,509, 573 P.2d 907,909 (Ariz. App. 
1977); Catania v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 381 So.2d 265 (Fla. App. 1980); Givens v. 
Hixson, 275 Ark. 370,631 S.W.2d 263 (1982). 
35Note, Protecting Employees At Will Against Wrongful Discharge: The Public Pol-
icy Exception, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1931, 1948 (1983). 
36E.g., Novosel v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 495 F. Supp. 344 (E.D. Mich. 1980); 
Craig v. Burroughs Corp., 560 F. Supp. 849 (C.D. Cal. 1983). 
37 Contract damages for wrongful discharge have not been negligible. See, e.g., For-
tune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E. 2d 1251 (1977) (lost com-
missions of $46,000); Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579,292 N.W. 
2d 880 (1980) ("legitimate expectations" of $73,000 and $300,000, including unexer-
cised stock options for two plaintiffs). But cf. Piacitelli v. Southern Utah State College, 
636 P.2d 1063 (Utah 1981) (back pay only for period during which employee was denied 
"contractual due process" in dismissal); Pepsi Cola Gen. Bottlers, Inc. v. Woods, 440 
N.E.2d 696 (Ind. App. 1982) (nominal damages only for justifiable reliance in leaving 
prior job). 
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ing, could be found to constitute, either separately or in combination, an 
express or implied contract that the employee would not be discharged 
except for "just cause." The leading decisions included Pugh v. See's 
Candies, Inc., 38 in California, Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of 
Michigan, 39 in Michigan, and Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, lnc., 40 in New 
York. In the past, employer statements that an employee would not be 
terminated except for good cause would have been treated as simply uni-
lateral declarations of present intent, of no legal consequence. They were 
like the "social promises" encountered in first-year contracts, where the 
fickle swain said he would meet his date under the Biltmore clock at eight 
on Saturday. Under the traditional view, even an employer's assurance of 
"permanent" employment would not change the arrangement from that 
of an at-will contract.41 
Probably a majority of the courts that have faced the issue during the 
past decade have declined to recognize employee handbooks or other cus-
tomary expressions of employer personnel policies as legally binding. 42 
For these courts, apparently, such employer statements are more like 
"puffing" or "social promises" than true contractual commitments, 
even though the commercial employment setting plainly differs from that 
of a young couple on a date. For myself, I do not find it shocking that an 
38Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981). Ac-
cord: Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc, lll Cal App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980); 
Hodge v. Evans Fin. Corp., 707 F.2d 1566 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Shah v. American Synthetic 
Rubber Corp., 655 S.W.2d 489 (Ky. 1983); Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 
N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983). See also Simpson v. Western Graphics Corp., 293 Ore. 96, 
643 P.2d 1276 (1982) (employer may justify decision to dismiss by showing good faith); 
Hernandez v. Home Ed. Livelihood Program, Inc., 98 N.M. 125, 645 P.2d !381 (N.M. 
App. 1982), cert. denied, 90 N.M. 336 (1982); Adelson v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 128 
Cal. ~P· 3d 891, 180 Cal. Rptr. 676 (1982) (campus practice for nontenured employee). 
3 Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 408 Mich. 579,292 N.W.2d 880 
(1980). 
40Weinerv. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d458, 443 N.E.2d44l (1982). 
41See, e.g., Edwards v. Kentucky Utils. Co., 286 Ky. 341, 150 S.W.2d 916 (1941). 
42E.g., White v. Chelsea Indus., Inc., 425 So.2d 1090 (Ala. 1983); Heideck v. Kent 
Gen. Hosp., 446 A.2d 1095 (Del. 1982); Sargent v. Illinois Inst. of Technology, 78 Ill. 
App. 3d 117, 397 N.E. 2d 443 (1979); Shaw v. S.S. Kresge Co., 167 Ind. App. l, 328 
N.E. 2d 775 (1975); Johnson v. National Beef Packing Co., 551 P.2d 779 (Kan. 1976); 
Mau v. Omaha Nat'! Bank, 207 Neb. 373, 299 N.W. 2d 147 (1980); Reynolds Mfg. v. 
Medoza, 644 S.W. 2d 536 (Tex. Civ. App. 1982); Parker v. United Airlines, Inc., 32 
Wash. App. 722, 649 P.2d 181 (1982); Halsell v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 683 F.2d 285 
(8th Cir. 1982) (Arkansas law); White v. International Tel. & Tel. Co., 718 F.2d 994 
(llth Cir. 1983) (Georgia law); Caster v. Hennessey, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3452 (llth 
Cir. 1984) (Florida law). See also Edwards v. Citibank, N.A., lOO Misc. 2d 59, 418 
N.Y.S. 2d 269 (1979), affd, 74 A.D. 2d 553, 425 N.Y.S. 2d 327 (1980), appeal dis-
missed, 51 N.Y.2d 875, 414 N.E. 2d 400 (1980). Edwards was distinguished in Weiner 
v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y. 2d 458,443 N.E. 2d 441 0982). 
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employer should be held to his word, when that is deliberately inscribed 
in company documents or spoken in earnest by a responsible official. 
This seems especially true when an employee has relied on that word by 
changing jobs or declining other offers. 
Companies whose current personnel manuals contain language sug-
gesting the existence of ''just cause'' protections for employees face a se-
rious practical question. Left unchanged, such provisions may become 
the grounds for a lawsuit. On the other hand, their removal could ad-
versely effect morale in the work force. Moreover, there is a legal ques-
tion whether the unilateral elimination of such guarantees would be effec-
tive as to incumbent employees, at least as to those who could 
demonstrate some specific past reliance on the old provision. If existing 
"just cause" language is to be removed, it would be prudent to couple 
that, quite explicitly, with the grant of some additional compensation or 
other employment benefits. Regardless of these legal considerations, 
however, my own feeling is that whether or not these troubling provisions 
are to be excised should be decided largely as a matter of personnel pol-
icy, not law. 
Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
In Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 43 the Supreme Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts enunciated a principle which, carried to its logical 
conclusion, could well eviscerate the whole at-will employment doc-
trine. 44 The facts in Fortune were appalling. A veteran salesman of 
twenty-five years' standing had been working for some time on a five 
million dollar order. Just after the sale was consummated, he was fired. 
The jury was held entitled to find that the employer's reason for terminat-
ing the salesman was to deprive hiim of his full commission. In the eyes 
of the court, this "bad faith" termination was a breach of the covenant of 
"good faith and fair dealing" imposed by law on the parties to any 
contract. 
Fortune plainly suggests a substantial extension of the traditional 
contract doctrine of good faith and fair dealing. Ordinarily it has not been 
seen as a catch-all safeguard against arbitrary conduct on the part of the 
contracting party, such as an unjust dismissal, but rather as a fairly spe-
43Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N .E.2d 1251 (1977). 
See also Maddaloni v. Western Mass. Bus Lines, Inc., 386 Mass. 877,438 N.E.2d 351 
(1982); Buysse v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtiss, 623 F.2d 1244 (8th Cir. 1980) 
(Minnesota law). 
44 Arguing essentially that that is what should happen is Note, Protecting At Will Em-
ployment Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 92 
HARV. L. REV. 1816 (1980). 
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cific duty imposed by law that neither party do anything which will inter-
fere with the other's performance of its contractual obligations or which 
will interfere with the right of the other to receive the benefits of the 
agreement. 45 The doctrine has not been concerned with the right to termi-
nate a contract as such. Furthermore, resort to a novel articulation of the 
good faith concept was hardly necessary in Fortune. Good faith could 
have been invoked without regard to the discharge itself. Or the classic 
principle that full or substantial performance entitles a contracting party 
to the agreed price would have served quite adequately. 46 
At least one California court has come very close to saying that the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing does protect at least a long-service 
employee from discharge without just cause. In Cleary v. American Air-
lines, Inc., 47 the employer had established an internal grievance proce-
dure for resolving employee disputes, and the employee in question was 
an eighteen-year veteran at the time of his discharge. The California 
Court of Appeals seemed to concentrate at one point only on the latter 
factor when it stated: ''Termination of employment without legal cause 
after such a period of time offends the implied-in-law covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing contained in all contracts including employment 
contracts.' '48 Cleary also held that a breach of the covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing sounds in tort as well as contract, thereby allowing com-
pensatory and punitive damages. 
Several courts have expressly rejected a broad application of the im-
plied covenant of good faith. In Murphy v. American Home Products 
Corp., 49 the New York Court of Appeals reasoned that any implied cove-
nant would have to be ''in aid and furtherance of other terms of the agree-
ment of the parties.'' The court then went on to observe that the plain-
tiff's employment in this instance was at will, leaving the employer "an 
unfettered right to terminate. " 50 The court concluded: "In the context of 
such an employment it would be incongruous to say that an inference may 
be drawn that the employer impliedly agreed to a provision which would 
be destructive of his right of termination.' ' 51 
45See, e.g., RESTATEMENT(SEC<)ND)OF CONTRACTS§ 205 (1981); 3 A. CORBIN. CON· 
TRACTS§§ 570-71 (1960). 
463A A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS§ 700 (1960). 
47Cieary v. American Airlines, Inc., Ill Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 
(1980); cf. Gates v. Life of Mont. Ins. Co., 638 P.2d 1063 (Mont. 1982). 
48Cleary, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 729. 
49Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y. 2d 293, 304,448 N.E.2d 86, 
461 N. Y.S. 2d 232 (1983). Accord: Walker v. Modem Reality of Mo., 675 F.2d 1002 (8th 
Cir. 1982); Martin v. Federal Life Ins. Co., 109 Ill. App. 3d 596, 440N.E.2d 998 (1982); 
Gordon v. Mathew Bender & Co., 562 F. Supp. 1286 (N.D. Ill. 1983). 
50Murphy, 58 N.Y. 2d at 304. 
51 /d. at 304-05. 
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''Negligent Performance'' of Contract Duties 
In what may be something of a sport, a federal district court held in 
Chamberlain v. Bissell, Inc., 52 that an employer could be liable for the 
"negligent performance" of its contract duties in discharging an em-
ployee. In this instance the performance of a previously satisfactory em-
ployee had deteriorated over time. The employer had failed to apprise the 
employee adequately of his substandard work. For its carelessness in car-
rying out its job evaluation program, the company was held partially lia-
ble under a comparative negligence theory for the financial losses suf-
fered by the employee upon his discharge. Chamberlain opens up some 
fascinating new vistas, but so far there are no signs that other courts are 
prepared to follow its lead. 
CRITIQUE 
In General 
Legal scholars have generally approved the dismantling of employ-
ment at will. 53 For the most part, it is a matter of simple justice. Concep-
tually, there is nothing to be said in favor of an employer's right to treat 
its employees arbitrarily or unfairly. Practicalities, naturally, are the 
problem. Recognition of a wrongful discharge action will limit employer 
flexibility and add to the cost of doing business. Frivolous claims will be 
inevitable. Once past the egregious instances of employer arbitrariness, 
some courts will flounder without guidelines in trying to define the 
boundaries of public policy. Emotional juries will be carried away in 
awarding massive damages. 54 Finally, it will be argued that the need for 
52Chamberlain v. Bissell, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 1067 (W.O. Mich. 1982). 
53 See, e.g., Aaron, Constitutional Protections Against Unjust Dismissals from Em-
ployment: Some Reflections, in NEW TECHNIQUES IN LABOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION 13 (H. 
Anderson ed. 1976); Blackburn, Restricted Employer Discharge Rights: A Changing 
Concept of Employment At Will, 17 AMER. Bus. L. J. 467 (1980); Blades, Employment At 
Will vs. Individual Freedom: Of Limiting the Abuse of Exercise of Employer Power, 67 
CoLUM. L. REV. 1404 (1967); Blumrosen, Strangers No More: All Workers Are Entitled 
to "Just Cause" Protection Under Title VII, 2 IND. REL L. J. 519 (1978); Peck, supra 
note 12; Stieber, supra note 2; Summers, supra note 3; Symposium, Individual Rights in 
the Workplace: The Employment At-Will Issue, 16 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 199 (1983). 
54Single plaintiffs have been awarded four million dollars and more in compensatory 
and punitive damages. For judgments on appeal, see Cancellier v. Federated Dep't 
Stores, 672 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 131 (1983) ($1.9 million 
in actual and punitive damages, plus $400,000 in attorneys' fees, for three executives); 
McGrath v. Zenith Radio Corp., 651 F.2d 458 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 835 
(1981) ($300,000 actual and $1 million punitive damages awarded one managerial em-
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radical measures has not really been demonstrated; the vast majority of 
employers treat their employees fairly. For these and other reasons, a 
quiet counterattack has been launched by a few commentators, who 
would confine if not roll back the recent revolution in unjust dismissal 
law. 55 
On balance I think the equities tilt toward the individual employee. 
Recognizing a wrongful discharge action will impose some additional 
burdens on business; failing to recognize it will perpetuate the devastation 
visited annually on about 100,000 workers who are fired without just 
cause. 56 American business would not be placed at a competitive disad-
vantage in the international markets. Protection against unfair discharge 
is now provided by statute in about sixty countries around the world, in-
cluding all of the Common Market, Sweden and Norway, Japan, Canada, 
and others in South America, Africa, and Asia. 57 The International Labor 
Organization recommended in 1963 and again in 1982 that workers not 
be terminated except for a valid reason. 58 The United States remains the 
last major industrial democracy that has not heeded the call for unjust dis-
misallegislation. 
In my view the question for the future is not whether the modification 
of at-will doctrine will continue, but whether the task will be completed 
by the courts or the legislatures. In the past there were two schools of 
thought: statutes are necessary to protect employee rights because the ju-
diciary is too encrusted by adverse precedent;59 contrarily, the courts 
must act because legislation is so much the product of organized interest 
groups, and the individual worker is by definition unorganized. 60 With 
the benefit of several years' hindsight, one can say that it is not at all im-
possible a solution will be fashioned by the judiciary. But the courts are 
likely to be long on generalization and short on detail when it comes to 
spelling out procedures, remedies, and so on. At the same time, even 
ployee). A defendants' law firm in San Francisco studied California discharge cases that 
went to juries in 1982 and found that 90 percent resulted in plaintiffs' verdicts, with the 
average award being $450,000. Palefsky, Wrongful Termination Litigation: "Dagwood" 
and Goliath, 62 MICH. B. J. 776 (1983). 
55See Power, A Defense of the Employment At Will Rule, 27 ST. LOUIS U. L. REV. 
881 (1983); Note, Limiting the Right to Terminate At Will-Have the Courts Forgotten 
the E';l,loyer? 35 V AND L. REV. 201 (1982). 
See text accompanying note 2, supra. 
57 Association of the Bar of the City of New York, supra note 11, at 175. 
58/d. at 179-80; 1982 Convention Concerning Termination of Employment at the Ini-
tiative of the Employer, reprinted in INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONFERENCE, PROVISIONAL 
RECORD OF SIXTY-EIGHTH SESSION No. 30A (June 21, 1982). 
59Summers, supra note 3, at 521. 
60Peck, supra note 12, at 3. 
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though the legislatures may not wish to take the initiative for a whole fist-
ful of understandable political reasons, they may be goaded into action by 
the boldness of certain courts. Furthermore, it is entirely conceivable that 
at some point employers themselves might support legislation on the 
ground the compromises and greater exactness of a statutory solution are 
preferable to the broad strokes and blurred outlines often produced by an 
innovative judiciary - not to mention the crushing damages awarded by 
some outraged juries. 61 The upshot may be that in a number of states the 
process will go through two stages. The first few steps, halting, tentative, 
or even blundering, will be taken by the courts, and then the legislatures 
will be almost compelled to move in and provide a more definitive 
blueprint. 
A critical factor in securing legislative relief may be the attitude of 
organized labor. It is about the only interest group one can identify that 
might be willing to take the lead in promoting such a cause. A common 
assumption, however, is that unions will not favor legislation protecting 
employees against arbitrary treatment by employers because it will elimi-
nate or detract from one of the unions' prime selling points in their efforts 
to organize the unorganized. I cannot deny this possibility, but I think it 
would be as shortsighted as was organized labor's initial hostility toward 
the Fair Labor Standards Act. 62 First, and not insignificantly, organized 
labor could profit considerably from refurbishing its image as the cham-
pion of the disadvantaged. Second, and perhaps more practically, a uni-
versal rule against dismissal without cause should actually prove benefi-
cial to unions in their organizing drives. Now, when a union sympathizer 
is fired in the middle of a campaign, it must be established by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that a motivating factor in the discharge was the 
exercise of rights protected by the Labor Act. 63 This is frequently a bur-
den too heavy to bear. With a just cause requirement generally applica-
ble, it would be up to the employer to show that some positive, accept-
able basis existed for the discharge. Finally, I belive there is a strong 
likelihood that just cause standards will act more as a spur than a hin-
drance to union organizing. The promise of fair treatment will be held out 
to employees; the promise may remain a tantalizing and unrealized 
dream, however, unless there is present the means to actualize it. Con-
stant, effective representation and advocacy is the surest way to ensure 
61 See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
62F. DULLES. LABOR IN AMERICA 283-85 (1960). 
63Miller Elec. Mfg. v. NLRB, 265 F.2d 225 (7th Cir. 1959); NLRB v. West Point 
Mfg., 245 F.2d 783 (5th Cir. 1957); cf. NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 103 
S.Ct. 2469 (1983). 
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any right. That is a lesson public sector unions have already learned in 
representing employees in civil service proceedings. 
In addition to the possible reservations of organized labor, some neu-
trals in industrial relations might oppose a statutory just cause require-
ment for fear that it would erode such worthy values as voluntarism, pri-
vate initiative, and workplace creativity, and more particularly the 
collective bargaining process itself. I, too, treasure the unique American 
institution of union-employer bargaining, but when even so hardheaded 
an observer as John Dunlop can be found rhapsodizing on its ''beauty,' '64 
I think we should all be wary about being carried away by the mystique of 
the process. Collective bargaining, after all, is a means and not an end. 
The objective is the betterment of the individual working person. When 
only about a quarter of the labor force is currently afforded protection 
against unjust discipline, I feel the needs of the other three-quarters out-
weigh some theoretical risk to traditional bargaining processes. Even 
then, assuming history is any guide, we underrate the flexibility and resil-
ience of collective bargaining if we believe it cannot adapt to, and indeed 
exploit, a new legal environment. 
Statutory Proposals 
Elsewhere I have set forth at some length my thoughts on the details 
of a statutory procedure for protecting employees against unjust dis-
charge. 65 Briefly, I would recommend a "just cause" requirement for a 
dismissal in any establishment having more than ten or fifteen employ-
ees. Probationary employees with less than six months' service, and 
higher ranking, policy-making management personnel, would not be pro-
tected. Ideally, I think all discipline should be covered, but perhaps an 
appropriate compromise, at least at the outset, would be to cover only dis-
64Dunlop, The Social Utility of Collective Bargaining, in CHALLENGES TO COLLECT-
IVE BARGAINING 168-73 (L. Ulman ed. 1867). 
65St. Antoine, Protection Against Unjust Discipline: An Idea Whose Time Has Long 
Since Come, in ARBITRATION ISSUES FOR THE 1980s, PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-
FOURTH ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 43, 52-61 (J. Stern & 
B. Dennis eds. 1982). For other views, see Summers, supra note 3; Howlett, Due Process 
for Nonunionized Employees: A Practical Proposal, in INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS RESEARCH 
ASS'N, PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-SECOND ANNUAL MEETING 164 (B. Dennis ed. 
1980); STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW SECTION, To STRIKE A 
NEW BALANCE: REPORT OF THE AD Hoc COMMITTEE ON TERMINATION AT WILL AND 
WRONGFUL DISCHARGE (1984). In recent years "just cause" bills have been introduced in 
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, Ohio, Penn-
sylvania, Wisconsin, and the U.S. Congress, See, e.g., Ann Arbor [Mich.] News, June 
10, 1984, at C5, col. I. 
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charges and "constructive discharges," i.e., resignations or quits re-
sulting from improper employer conduct. 
To avoid the expense, length, and formality of court proceedings, I 
would create a panel of arbitrators as adjudicators. Arbitration should 
probably be preceded by mediation and a "reasonable cause" determina-
tion to sift out frivolous claims. Adopting the arbitration format would 
immediately make available the vast body of arbitral precedent concern-
ing substance and procedure that has been developed in countless deci-
sions since the Second World War. It would also permit the use of an es-
tablished nucleus of experienced arbitrators, and of the growing number 
of young, able aspirants who are caught in the vicious circle of being de-
nied experience because they have no experience. The arbitrator's cost 
would be borne equally by the parties, although the arbitrator might have 
the discretion to charge the full amount to the employer in the less defen-
sible cases. 
As remedies I would authorize the arbitrator to award backpay, rein-
statement, or severance pay, as the circumstances warrant. This of course 
would be a trade-off that I hope might make unjust dismissal legislation 
more palatable to the business community. It would immediately elimi-
nate the possibility of the catastrophic compensatory tort or punitive dam-
age award that has already been the lot of many a hapless employer. 66 
CONCLUSION 
Protection against unjust discharge is fast acquiring the force of a 
moral and historical imperative. The common law of contract, tort, or 
even property needs only a small adjustment to accommodate this new 
concept. More to the point, statutory relief for this long-neglected abuse 
of the unorganized worker should now become part of the immediate 
agenda of conscientious legislators and of all those who labor in the field 
of industrial relations. 
The prevention of arbitrary treatment of employees may not only be 
the humane approach; there is evidence it is also good business. 67 In ape-
riod when intense attention is lavished on the Japanese way of manage-
ment, on the almost paternal relationship between Japanese employers 
and their employees, and the lifelong careers guaranteed many workers in 
66See, supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
67See, e.g., Foulkes, Large Nonunionized Employers, in U.S. INDUSTRIAL RELA-
TIONS 1950-1980: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 129, 134-36, 141-44, 155-56 (J. Stieber, R. 
McKersie & D. Mills eds. 1980). 
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Japanese companies, we should be prepared to entertain the proposition 
that there may be a marked correlation between a secure work force and 
high productivity and quality output. 68 Justice, like honesty, can be the 
best policy. 
68See, e.g., E. VOGEL, JAPAN AS NUMBER ONE: LESSONS FOR AMERICA 131-57 
(1979); cf. SPECIAL TASK FORCE, DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, WORK IN 
AMERICA 93-110, 188-201 (1972). 
